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     For decades now, the nature of independent leaners has been a source of debate and 
dispute.  Are those people who self-identify as independent leaners skeptical, critical 
thinkers, or are they actually closet partisans who are simply denying their partisanship.  
Questions of religiosity are used as proxies to measure an individual’s inclination towards 
affect in general.  The question asked is whether independent leaners show lower levels of 
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     For decades now, the nature of independent leaners has been a source of debate and 
dispute.  Are those people who self-identify as independent leaners skeptical, critical 
thinkers, or are they actually closet partisans who are simply denying their partisanship?  
Questions of religiosity are used as proxies to measure an individual’s inclination towards 
affect in general.  The question asked is whether independent leaners show lower levels of 
religiosity than both strong and weak partisans.  
     In the American National Election Surveys (ANES), partisanship and independence are 
measured on a seven-point scale in response to a series of questions.  The first question asked 
of the respondents is whether they think of themselves as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
independent, or what?  The responses to this first question provide us with a three-point scale 
categorizing more than two-thirds of the sample into the categories of Republican, Democrat, 
and independent.  Republicans and Democrats are then asked about the strength of their 
partisanship by asking if they consider themselves to be strong or weak Republicans or 
Democrats.  At this point we then have a five-point scale of political party affiliation.  Those 
respondents who initially self-identify as independents are asked an additional question to 
tease out political preferences by asking whether they think of themselves as being closer to 
the Republican or Democratic parties.  This adds two new categories to round out the seven-
point scale which is typically organized as: strong Democrat, weak Democrat, (independent) 
leans Democrat, (pure) independent, (independent) leans Republican, weak Republican, and 
strong Republican.  It is those individuals that initially classify themselves as independents, 
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but under further prompting admit to a preference for one of the parties that are the subject of 
this inquiry. 
     Who are the so-called “partisan independents” (Keith et al, 1992)?  The question itself 
presents a problem in that the two terms contradict each other; either one is partisan or one is 
independent.  Flanigan and Zingale define partisanship as “the sense of attachment or 
belonging that an individual feels for a political party” (1998, 51).  If a partisan hears one of 
their party leaders advocating for a specific policy, they will have “a basis in party loyalty for 
supporting that policy, quite apart from other considerations” (54).  Political candidates 
sanctioned by the party may also find an inherent favorable inclination from their party’s 
partisans.  A political independent, by definition, is an individual who would not have this 
same form of political party attachment. 
     A textbook from the end of the 19
th
 century within the polarized environment of the spoils 
system, categorized independents this way: 
 





This definition of an independent accepts that the independent will affiliate with one or the 
other party, but that that affiliation ends when the party’s concept of the public good is in 
conflict with the independent’s concept of the public good.  The key to this particular 
     As on the playground, some do not always care to go with the crowd, or even 
prefer to be by themselves. Such as these, who think for themselves, and dare to 
stand alone, make the Independents in politics. 
     They are likely to prefer the good of their country to the success of their party.  
They will not act with their party, or will leave it, if it is wrong.  If the other party 
changes, as parties sometimes change, and advocates measures that they believe 
in; if they change their own minds as sensible men sometimes must; or if the 
other party puts forward better candidates; or if a new party arises, the 
independent voters are willing to act wherever they can best secure the public 




definition is that it defines an independent not as lacking in party affiliation, but that the 
nature of that affiliation differs substantially from that of a partisan. 
 
Evolution of the Debate 
     This textbook view of an independent remained dominant until the publishing of The 
American Voter by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960).  These authors analyzed 
data from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan with the view that, as a 
bloc, independents “have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues, their image of the 
candidates is fainter, their interest in the campaign is less, their concern over the outcome is 
relatively slight, and their choice between competing candidates, although it is indeed made 
later in the campaign, seems much less to spring from discoverable evaluations of the 
elements of national politics” (Campbell, et al, 1960, 143).  These findings were in the 
context of record consensus between the political parties (Downs, 1957; McCarty, et al, 
2006) in which party policies differed only at the margins, liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives could be found in either party, and faith in government was high (Skocpol, 
1996, 109).  Under these conditions, with both parties acting in a manner that is providing 
positive results for society, with an absence of extreme positions, it would follow that the 
textbook independent would have no qualms about declaring a preference for a specific 
party.  It is also in this context that only the politically unaware would be unable to identify a 
preference for a particular party. 
     During the 1960s, there was an increase in the percentage of the population that identified 
themselves as being independent (Bowler et al, 2009; Campbell, et al, 1980; Keith, et al, 
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1992).  During the 1960s, there were many potential causes of a possible realignment 
including the nomination of Barry Goldwater by Republicans, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which gave way to a realignment of the South from a 
Democratic stronghold to a Republican stronghold, and the Viet Nam War which found 
students, fearing the draft, responding favorably to Nixon’s message to end the war.  Some 
have argued that in the realignment process, the position of independent leaner was taken as a 
temporary placeholder by some as they shifted party allegiance from one party to another 
(Flanigan and Zingale, 1998).  For example, from 1952 to 1968 the percentage of white 
voters declaring themselves to be independent increased from 12% to 37% with the spike at 
37% coinciding with former Democrat and segregationist George Wallace running as an 
independent candidate in 1968 (Keith et al, 1992, 34).   
     Studies conducted with data from this period began to distinguish between “pure” 
independents and independent leaners.  Data compiled that separated out these two groups 
individually consistently came back with the same results:  “Partisan Independents always 
have been relatively interested, informed, and active, and Pure Independents have been 
notably uninterested, ignorant and inactive” (Keith et al, 1992, 41).  Demographic data 
regarding these two groups found “Pure Independents are at the bottom and partisan 
Independents at or near the top on measures of political involvement” (Keith et al, 1992, 41) 
and political sophistication.  In terms of political party involvement and activity including 
participating in primaries, financial contributions, meeting attendance, being delegates at 
conventions, and concern with who wins the election, the independent leaners are similar to 
weak partisans.  In terms of political sophistication and knowledge, the independent leaners 
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are more like strong partisans.  Above all, the independent leaners, in the aggregate, bear 
very little resemblance to pure independents.  Independent leaners are above average in 
education and income while pure independents are below average in these regards.  This 
assertion is echoed in data presented by Phillip Converse in 1964, Walter Dean Burnham in 
1970, Robert Cantor in 1975, Theodore J Macaluso in 1977, Warren E. Miller and Teresa E 
Levitin in 1976, and John C. Pierce and Paul R Hagner in 1988 (Keith et al, 1992). 
     There is no debate remaining in the literature regarding the apolitical nature of pure 
independents, and that as a group they diverge in almost all respects from independent 
leaners, with the exception of initially identifying themselves as independents.  It is for this 
reason that I focus on an issue that continues to be debated, whether there is any real 
difference between partisans and independent leaners.  In response to the claim that 
independents “share some characteristics that differentiate them in important ways from 
Republicans and Democrats” The Myth of the Independent Voter declares “This assumption 
is wrong.  Independents, defined inclusively have little in common. They are more diverse 
than either Republicans or Democrats.  Most of them are not uncommitted, and they are not a 
bloc.  They are largely closet Democrats and Republicans” (Keith et al, 1992, 4). 
     In The Myth of the Independent Voter, Keith et al (1992) do an admirable job of tracing 
the debate of the independence or partisanship of independent leaners; providing survey data 
and information gleaned from other studies to determine if there truly is a difference between 
leaners and partisans that can be teased from the data.  Numerous hypotheses are tested and 
discarded, including political behavior, attitudes, and demographics.  As has already been 
discussed, a good deal of their data on political behavior shows independent leaners as 
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behaving very similarly to weak partisans in terms of party activity and political knowledge.  
In addition, the behavior of the leaners is very similar to that of weak partisans in terms of 
voter turnout, party loyalty at the ballot box, and the frequency of split-ticket voting.  One 
dataset where leaners and weak partisans differed consistently and by large amounts is in 
self-reporting of whether the respondent has “always voted for the same party’s presidential 
candidate” (Keith et al, 1992, 104).  The authors pointed to panel studies performed by 
Richard A. Brody that showed respondents who switched parties as claiming that they had 
always voted for the same party.  Those who showed consistency in their party loyalty during 
the panel study often indicated that they had not always voted for that party.  Brody’s panel 
study casts doubt on the validity of this question, and Keith et al, (1992) suggest that it may 
well be that those who identify themselves as party loyalists may value party loyalty while 
those who identify themselves as independents value political independence and that 
responses to this question may more clearly reflect affect for the term than necessarily past 
behavior. 
     Keith et al (1992) also look at the relationship of age to partisanship.  This relationship 
developed relatively recently.  “Not until 1964 were people under the age of 29 significantly 
more likely than the entire population to be Pure Independent.  In 1968 a monotonic 
relationship between youth and pure independence emerged” (Keith et al, 1992, 116), a 
similar pattern is seen for independent Democrats starting in 1956.  The strongest growth in 
independents from 1965 to 1967 came in the age groups from 21-29 and 30-49, the highest 
income brackets, college educated, minorities, and white-collar occupations (Burnham, 
1970).  This increase in independents coincides with substantial increases of educational 
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attainment for the 25-29 age groups from 1950 to the late 1970s as funding for education 
increased and college deferments from the draft swelled the enrollment rates of colleges and 
universities.  In 1950, this age group had less than 10% with Bachelor’s degrees and just over 
50% with a high school education.  By 1980, this age group had over 20% with Bachelor’s 
degrees and nearly 90% had a high school diploma (US Census Bureau, 2003).  This was 
commented on by Gerald Pomper (1975) “The growth of Independents has come particularly 
in those persons with sufficient education to permit freedom from party cues” (Keith et al, 
1992, 129). 
     Keith et al (1992) do find strong correlations between age and partisanship, and attribute 
much of the growth in the 1970s of self-identified independents as being associated with the 
baby boomer generation reaching voting age and the introduction of the 26
th
 Amendment. 
     Attitudes toward political parties, interest groups, and political issues were also tested.  
With the use of feeling thermometers, in which respondents are asked to rate how they feel 
about a particular party, group or policy a score is provided on a scale of 0 to 100.  Designed 
to measure “warmth of affect” (Keith et al, 1992), a score above 50 would denote a positive 
affect for the question object, where a score below 50 would denote a negative affect.  A 
score of 50 then might denote ambivalence.  Averages of these scores were taken by self-
identification on the 7-point scale and compared. When feeling thermometers looked at 
“marijuana users, women’s liberationists, black militants, radical students, civil rights 
leaders, and urban rioters” (Keith et al, 1992, 154), all categories of partisan identification 
showed negative responses to these groups when combined into one group.  While the 
Republican side of the equation follows the predictable monotonic order, the Democratic side 
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does not.  Independent Democratic leaners show greater tolerance for these groups while 
strong Democrats appear similar to independent Republicans and weak Democrats appear 
similar to weak Republicans.  A similar test was run with attitudes toward “the police, the 
military, and big business” (155).  All partisan classifications were positive to these three 
groups when lumped together.  The monotonic relationship displayed here, however, differed 
slightly from the previous group.  In this set of data from the 1972 Michigan survey, 
independent leaners were the least favorable to these groups, weak partisans slightly more 
favorable with strong partisans being most favorable.  Four of these seven classifications of 
partisanship provided scores of 67 or 68, so this does not provide for a significant finding, 
but it does suggest a question that bears closer scrutiny.  Do those who claim stronger 
partisan affiliation have greater respect for authority than those with weaker affiliations?  The 
responses were also broken down by age group, with younger age groups having a less 
negative view of anti-authority groups and older age groups having a more positive view of 
authority figures. 
     In terms of political behavior, political knowledge, political attitudes, and attitudes toward 
parties and issues Keith et al (1992) and later, John Petrocik (2009) found no substantive 
difference between independent leaners and weak partisans other than the inclination to 
identify themselves differently when responding to whether they are a Democrat, a 
Republican, or an independent.  In Petrocik’s (2009) analysis, he concludes that independents 
are closet partisans whose self-representation is a mischaracterization “about how they 
approach elections and make judgments about candidates.” (572)   
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     Returning to the textbook definition of an independent provided earlier in this paper, there 
is no real indication that the independent will differ from the partisan in any of the observable 
behaviors tested for by Keith et al (1992) or Petrocik (2009) with the possible exception of 
party defection and split-ticket voting.  Still, more recent data collected in the context of third 
party candidates have shown greater variance in these political behaviors between partisans 
and independent leaners (Bowler, et al, 2009) than shown by Keith et al (1992) and Petrocik 
(2009).  However, it is the thought processes through which the observable behavior is 
derived that separates the independents from the partisans.   
 
Partisanship and Religiosity 
     By returning briefly to the time period from the textbook description of independents, the 
late 19
th
 century, Walter Dean Burnham (1982) identified correlations between religious 
preferences and partisan direction in survey data from Hendricks County, Indiana.  Pietistic 
(Protestant) observers predominantly identified with the Republican Party (23.8% D, 72.3% 
R).  Liturgical (Catholic and Jewish) observers predominantly identified with the Democratic 
Party (79.7% D, 14.4% R).  Those who professed no religious denomination were evenly 
split in party preference (48.4% D, 47.1% R).  Burnham believed that a dearth of 
entertainment and social interaction left a void filled with both religious and political rally 
attendance.  Those with whom you attended church were also those who attended the 
political rally of your choice.  Both were social events.  This relationship has largely been 
taken for granted over the years and has been commented on in much of the literature 
(Campbell et al., 1980; Flanigan and Zingale, 1998). 
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     Kenneth Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown (2010) provide similar studies regarding 
denominational choice and partisan direction.  Their classifications of partisanship are split 
into only three categories; Democrats, Republicans, and independents, with independent 
leaners being grouped with their preferred parties.  Wald and Calhoun-Brown, using more 
recent data than previous studies showing Catholics as strong Democrats, identify Catholics 
as now being situated in the political middle of the electorate. 
     In a study very similar in intent to what I am considering here, Stephen Mockabee (2007) 
utilized a broader “authority-mindedness” measure to determine partisan strength and 
direction which found that strong Republicans had higher levels of respect for authority and 
strong Democrats had lower levels of respect for authority.  For his measure of “authority-
mindedness” he incorporated the variables for biblical interpretation, religious affiliation, and 
religious commitment.   
     Campbell et al. (1980) discuss social cross-pressures that would create “conflict within the 
individual’s psychological field to membership in social groupings of dissimilar political 
preferences.”  This contradictory effect was further examined by Maruice Mangum (2008) in 
his discussion of how black Protestants, an ideologically Conservative group in religious 
matters, tend to remain faithful to the Democratic Party while white Catholics appear to be 
deserting the party.   
     Mangum (2008) concluded that the variables of religious guidance and church attendance 
worked in opposing directions with black Protestants.  The religious guidance variable 
correlated positively with Democratic Party identification while church attendance correlated 
negatively with Democratic Party identification.  Mangum was looking at how these 
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variables affected partisan direction in a black population, I am more concerned with how 
these variables might affect bidirectional partisan strength in the broader society. 
     If we return to the original concept of what it means to be a partisan and what it means to 
be independent, we realize that it may not always be the political attitudes and voting 
behaviors of the individual that determine their level of partisanship, but the evaluative 
processes behind how those attitudes and behaviors are derived.  Discussions of the 
evaluative process necessarily involve both cognitive and affective perceptions.  Those 
declaring greater party loyalty may well respond more readily to their affective perceptions 
within the evaluative process.   
      The question of whether the evaluative processes of political independents differ from 
that of partisans is not necessarily discernible from observable behavior because it is an 
internal process.  The challenge that this provides the researcher is whether there is data 
available that may more clearly provide insight to these thought processes. 
 
The Psychological Bases of Partisan Strength 
     In 2000, Steven Greene published “The Psychological Sources of Partisan-Leaning 
Independence”.  Greene utilized a survey that was admittedly suboptimal in its methodology 
of sample selection, and did not mirror the U.S. population.  Surveys were sent out to 1,250 
registered voters in a single metropolitan Midwestern county with the incentive of a $150 
drawing for one of the respondents.  The sample was developed from the 302 surveys that 
were returned.  Eighty-nine percent of the respondents were white and the sample was more 
conservative than is usually found in nationally representative surveys (43% Republican, 
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29% Democrat, 48% conservative, 26% liberal).  In this survey, he used an 
affective/cognitive measurement strategy previously employed by social psychologists. 
     The affective/cognitive measurement strategy adopted by Greene (2000) used the 
“Democratic party” and the “Republican party” as attitude objects (519).  Three sets of terms 
were used to measure affect, cognition, and evaluation for each party.  Each of the 
measurement sets contained both positive and negative terms.  Respondents were asked to 
rate the political parties on a seven-point scale according to whether they felt the word was 
representative of the party in question, with 1 indicating “not at all” and 7 indicating 
“definitely”.  With the affective set, respondents were asked how the parties made them feel.  
The eight words used in the affective measure were “delighted, happy, joy, relaxed, hateful, 
disgusted, annoyed, and angry”. (519)  The cognitive word set included “useful, valuable, 
beneficial, wise, unsafe, unhealthy, worthless, and harmful.” (520)  The evaluative word set 
used “good, positive, like, desirable, bad, dislike, undesirable, and negative” as 
measurements.  The average of the negative responses within each measurement set was 
subtracted from the average of the positive responses to derive measures of affect, cognition, 
and evaluation ranging from a positive attitude (6) toward the party in question to a negative 
attitude (-6).  These data were then analyzed in relation to the respondents’ preferred parties 
to derive the strength of affect and cognition in the evaluative process.  
     Steven Greene (2000) identified strong partisans as being distinguished by having more 
positive attitudes (in affect, cognition, and evaluation measures) “across the board” (522) 
toward their preferred party.  Affective and cognitive measures for weak partisans and 
leaners showed little to no statistical difference from each other, however, there was variation 
13 
 
between these two groups in the weight of affect vs. cognition in overall evaluation.  
“Leaners represent a group where cognition is a dominant component of partisanship, with 
affect playing no role, in contrast to true partisans (both weak and strong) where cognition is 
the primary component of partisan evaluation, but significantly supplemented by partisan 
affect” (Greene 2000, 522). 
     In addition to his discussion of cognitive and affective differences between independent 
leaners and partisans, Greene also discussed the role of  political socialization and the 
inclination of children to adopt the political parties of their parents long before policy 
positions, candidates, and issues hold any meaning (Greene, 2000).  Independent leaners are 
more likely than partisans to have at least one independent parent.   
     Greene (2000) was able to correctly classify 86% of his respondents between partisans 
and leaners.  Leaners showed an absence of affect in the evaluative process, more 
independent social identity, different patterns of parental socialization, and greater 
dissatisfaction with the parties than partisans.  It is the emphasis on cognition in the 
evaluative process that is the focus of this paper. 
     In Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment, Marcus et al (2000) described people as 
operating with preexisting assumptions and opinions.  All new sensory information is seen as 
moving through the amygdala, deriving an emotional response, prior to moving to the cortex 
region for further processing.  The authors identify two different methods through which 
individuals make political decisions, one is through “casual, even thoughtless, reliance on 
habitual dispositions,” the other is through “reasoned consideration.” (95)  When the 
individual faces common, recurring conditions, habitual dispositions will prevail.  When a 
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novel or unusual condition presents itself, then the individual will move to reasoned 
consideration and search for more information on the topic. (Marcus et al, 2000)     
Their research determined that partisans who were anxious about their own candidates were 
more likely to indulge in information searches.  In the context of this theory, I would argue 
that while partisans and independents may well perform information searches, that the 
neutrality of these searches may well vary between the two groups.  Studies have shown that 
ideologically motivated individuals tend to self-select information sources and limit their 
searches to those sources that will confirm and fortify their existing worldview. (Taber and 
Lodge, 2010)  Data that contradict this worldview are denied or deflected by the partisan, 
where they are given greater consideration by the less ideological. (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010)  
The news media at large is distrusted while the self-selected source becomes a trusted source 
of information. (Gronke and Cook, 2007)  For example, partisans and independent leaners 
alike may be motivated by anxiety produced by the mortgage meltdown and the financial 
crisis to conduct an information search.  The independent leaner will look for unbiased, 
nonpartisan information to get a better understanding of the situation.  The partisan, on the 
other hand, will search for an explanation that conforms to their worldview, typically looking 
for information placing the blame for the mess on the shoulders of the opposing party.  Even 
though the information search is a cognitive process, when the form of the search is affective 
in nature, the activity cannot be classified as purely cognitive.    
     Two groups of scholars looked to potential genetic differences in studies involving twin 
pairs to determine whether partisanship is primarily a socialized phenomena or whether there 
might be a genetic element involved.  A potential genetic link to partisan strength may 
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indicate that independents and partisans process information differently as a matter of 
physiological differences.  If this is largely influenced by genotypic variation, we might 
consider the possibility that information processing differences would extend to both political 
and religious considerations.  
     As part of a symposium in Political Research Quarterly, in 2009, Hatemi et al and Settle 
et al published findings from twin studies
1
 examining possible genetic variation related to 
political partisanship.  The Hatemi group was geneticists aided by political scientists while 
the Settle group was political scientists aided by geneticists.  This is mentioned here as the 
methodologies employed vary slightly.  The results published in both studies found that 
genetic factors could account for nearly 50% of partisan strength but not partisan direction 
Hatemi, et al, 2009, 596; Settle et al, 2009, 605).        
     Greene (2000) identified a measure that demonstrated a difference between levels of 
affect in the evaluative process and partisan strength.  The research performed by Hatemi et 
al, (2009) and Settle et al, (2009) suggest that partisan strength, or the inclination to identify 
(or not identify) strongly with a political party may also be a heritable trait.  Both of the twin 
studies groups discussed religiosity as being analogous to partisan strength with partisan 
direction being analogous to denominational choice (Hatemi et al. 2009; Settle et al. 2009); 
the first being a heritable trait, while the second is not.  The results of both studies can be 
                                                 
1
     Twin studies have often been utilized to consider the question of nature versus nurture.  By studying 
monozygotic twins and dizygotic twins who would presumably share similar childhood experiences and levels 
of socialization/indoctrination, geneticists are able to assess the level of influence of environment and genetics 
for particular behaviors. The monozygotic twins are developed from a single fertilized egg (zygote) which splits 
into two different embryos, making the twins genetically identical.  Dizygotic twins, on the other hand are 
developed from two separate eggs fertilized from different sperm, resulting in an average of 50% of genetic 
similarities, similar to those shared of other siblings.  This assumption, which is the rationale for twin studies, 
has been reconsidered by recent studies of embryogenesis that disputes these claims of embryo development. 




described in this manner; “the intensity of one’s attachment to a group may be shaped by 
genetic predispositions, but the selection of the group to which one attaches is largely shaped 
by parental and environmental exposures” (Settle et al, 2009, 603). 
     While Keith et al (1992) and Petrocik found that there were no inherent differences in 
observable political behavior between weak partisans and independent leaners, the studies by 
Greene (2000), Hatemi et al (2009) and Settle et al (2009) show that it is possible to 
recognize more discreet psychological differences between the two groups.  Whether this is 
more closely linked to genetic factors or environmental factors is a question better left to the 
social psychologists, but a difference can be discerned nonetheless. 
     In 2004, Gallup analysts noted lower levels of religiosity by self-identified independents 
in comparison to self-identified Democrats and Republicans (Lyons, 2004).  
Unfortunately, their data was based on a three-point scale of Republican, Democrat, and 
Independent so there is little that we can look at in terms of partisan intensity.  While the 
differences are minor between partisans and independents on the question of stating a 
religious preference, a greater gap can be found in the data when the question is asked 
whether the respondent has a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in organized religion; 
63% of Republicans expressed this faith as did 52% of Democrats.  Only 39% of 
independents expressed confidence in organized religion.  Gallup suggests the following 
explanation:  “It’s possible that both the reluctance to adhere to specific religious ideas and 
behaviors and the reluctance to align oneself with an established political party both tend to 
spring from an unwillingness to commit oneself to a set of prescribed beliefs.”  This could 
suggest that those with low levels of affect in the religious realm may also show low levels of 
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affect in the political realm.  It is not the strength of a belief in a higher power that is of 
interest, but a faith in a more specific religious institution that would show high levels of 
affect. 
     When looking for a preexisting measurement in the ANES that may show distinct 
differences between partisans and independent leaners in levels of affect, the research above 
points to measures of religiosity as a possible clue to differences in partisan strength, or more 
precisely, differences between independent leaners, weak partisans, and strong partisans.  
Mockabee (2007) used religious measures in his overall measure of authority-mindedness, 
Mangum (2008) used religious measures to examine the effects of religiosity on the black 
population, Hatemi et al (2009) and Settle et al (2009) use religiosity as being analogous to 
partisan strength, and Gallup (Lyons, 2004) goes so far as to suggest a link between 
religiosity and the inclination to accept a prescribed set of political beliefs.  It would seem 
then, that measures of religiosity, or religious affect may well serve as a proxy measure of 
partisanship, or political affect. 
     Although the measures utilized are typically considered to be measures of religiosity 
(Flanigan and Zingale, 1998; Mangum, 2008; Mockabee, 2007; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 
2010), in this case they will be utilized to represent the level of affect in the evaluative 
process.  While Mockabee (2007) critiqued this form of using religious measures as a proxy 
for political worldviews, he did so in the context of his measurement of authority which was 
the key to his directional argument.  His concern was the assumption of some that secularists 
tend to have a more liberal outlook on social issues (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2010, 33).  I 
do not make that assumption, nor am I interested in partisan direction, only partisan strength.  
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I believe that greater levels of religious affect shall be correlated with greater levels of 
political affect.   
     A faith in a God or Gods, or some level of spirituality does not necessarily suggest a 
strong degree of affect.  It is when an individual is willing to accept the claims of another or 
the group as to the nature and will of God that affect would be strong.  This paper will seek 
to show that those who demonstrate high levels of religiosity will have an inclination toward 
high levels of affect toward political parties.  Those with lower levels of religiosity, on the 
other hand, will be more inclined toward political independence.  Weak partisans would be 
expected between the two extremes.   
     In a study published by John Petrocik (2009), independent leaners bear a close 
relationship to weak partisans on multiple issues.  The table below is a reproduction of Table 
5 from his article.  This classifies the aggregated responses working on a scale from 0 – the 
most liberal response possible, to 1 – the most conservative response possible. One item 
stands out in the table about which Petrocik did not comment.  Specifically, that the most  
 
Table 1. The Policy Preferences of Partisans 
  Dems  Ind  Reps  
Issue Strong Weak Lean Pure Lean Weak Strong 
Religion .62 .59 .49 .60 .57 .59 .69 
Race .46 .54 .56 .62 .67 .70 .73 
Abortion .41 .51 .45 .55 .59 .62 .72 
Gays .31 .37 .26 .41 .43 .48 .58 
Social 
welfare 
.27 .33 .30 .35 .43 .44 .52 
Force .54 .56 .54 .62 .68 .67 .78 
Size of gov’t .21 .27 .37 .39 .51 .46 .60 
Ideology .35 .46 .40 .53 .62 .64 .76 
Note: Reproduced from Petrocik (2009) The range of responses is from 0 (extremely liberal) 
to 1 (extremely conservative). 
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religious individuals would classify themselves as strong partisans, that weak partisans were 
less favorable to religion, and independent leaners were the least religious.  This correlation 
was bidirectional. 
    It is my belief that he ignored an important anomaly in his data that on further inspection 
may reveal a significant and relevant difference in thought processes between self-identified 
partisans and independents.  
 
Expectations 
     This research will not be looking into the “pure independents”.  The literature across 
decades concludes that these are typically apathetic, apolitical voters with little interest in 
politics. (Campbell et al., 1960; Keith et al., 1992)  There is no compelling reason to dispute 
this argument.  These individuals would be the most likely to be persuaded by campaign 
communications as they have little political information beyond the campaign on which to 
make a choice.  They truly are “up for grabs” and will likely support whichever candidate 
happens to make a good case at the time when the voter is paying attention. 
     Pure independents have lower levels of education and higher levels of religiosity than the 
independent leaners.  They are a small percentage of the population that, although they skew 
the data, they do not do so to a degree that correlations lose significance.  With the pure 
independents removed from the data, correlations between religiosity and partisan strength 
are strengthened.  They have been left in the calculations to avoid suggestions that they were 
removed as being inconvenient to the findings. 
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     This paper will look at those respondents who initially self-identify as independents, but 
on further prompting relate a preference for one of the two parties.  With the winner-take-all, 
single-district, American electoral system, a two party system is common.  In this 
environment, voters consider the policy positions of two rival candidates and make their 
selections accordingly.  By definition, the difference between the partisans and the leaners, is 
that the partisans may base their decision more on affect for the party and, ultimately, the 
party’s candidate.  Independent leaners, on the other hand, will be less likely to consider the 
party of the candidate before coming to a decision.  A strong Democrat and an independent 
who leans toward the Democratic Party may exhibit the same behavior in the casting of a 
ballot, but the process through which they reach that decision may differ.  
     The problem this presents is that observable behavior is not the key to the question, but 
the thought processes that bring about that behavior.  Whether the respondent is regarded as 
partisan or independent depends on questions of self-identification.  Whether through 
socialization processes or genetic predisposition, if an individual gives greater weight to 
affect in the evaluative process, is inclined to vote the party line, and more readily uses party 
identification as a strong basis for the decision-making process, I expect these differing 
evaluative processes to extend to other areas of their lives.   
     Measures of religiosity will be used for measures of affect.  The ANES measures of 
religiosity are imperfect as a measure of affect which will be discussed later, but at this time 
they may be the most appropriate indicator available. 
     I will examine ANES data from the 2000 (1807 respondents) and 2004 (1212 
respondents) Time Series Studies.  These years are recent and should still have some 
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relevance.  Presidential years are used as the general population tends to be more engaged.  
The year 2008 is not included as it is the first election year with a minority candidate that 
may skew the data.  Two years are used to determine if the findings are consistent or a one-
off variation. 
Table 2. Religious Preferences of Partisans  
7-point scale Average  7-point scale Average 
Strong Dem .62  Lean Dem .49 
Weak Dem .59  Lean Rep .57 
Lean Dem .49  Weak Dem .59 
Pure Ind .60  Weak Rep .59 
Lean Rep .57  Pure Ind .60 
Weak Rep .59  Strong Dem .62 
Strong Rep .69  Strong Rep .69 
Note: Reproduced from Petrocik (2009) The range of responses is from 0 (extremely liberal) 
to 1 (extremely conservative). 
 
     In table 2 I have reintroduced Petrocik’s religious scores that were previously introduced 
in table 1.  The left column shows the scores by order of the 7-point scale in which the scores 
are not monotonic.  The right column provides the scores in an ascending, monotonic order. 
     My expectation is that this pattern of lower levels of religiosity in independent leaners, to 
slightly higher levels in weak partisans, to even higher levels in strong partisans will be 
echoed in the ANES data in questions that can be used as a measure of religiosity.  If the 
independent leaners of the seven-point scale really have lower levels of affect in their 
political decision-making, we should also see lower levels of religiosity within this group. 
 
Methods 
     I use four measures of religiosity.  One variable involves a single question regarding the 
nature of the Bible.  Two other variables measure denominational affiliation/attendance and 
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religious importance/guidance, with questions whose answers are combined in a manner 
similar to how the seven-point partisan scale was developed, with certain responses to the 
first question leading to the asking of a follow up question.  These specific questions 
regarding biblical interpretation, church affiliation, and the importance of religious guidance 
have been used in the past as measures of religiosity. (Flanigan and Zingale, 1998; Mangum, 
2008; Mockabee, 2007; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2010)  The fourth will be a combined 
score of religious affect that is derived from the other three questions.  Responses to these 
questions will be compared to a “folded over” version of the ANES survey’s seven-point 
scale like the one used by Settle et al. (2009)(Gronke, 1997), with 0 coded for pure 
independents, 1 for independent leaners, 2 for weak partisans, and 3 for strong partisans.  I 
will test for the strength of correlation and the significance of the relationship between 
religious affect and partisan intensity. 
     I start with the question on the view of the Bible.  In the ANES survey, respondents are 
asked “Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?”  
The possible responses are: 1) “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken 
literally, word for word” 2) “The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should 
be taken literally, word for word”, and 3) “The Bible is a book written by men and is not the 
word of God.”  The options of other, don’t know, and refuse to answer have been dropped. 
Null hypothesis: There will be no correlation between a respondent’s professed level of 
partisanship and their belief in the authority of the Bible. 
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 Research hypothesis:  Strong partisans of both parties will have the greatest inclination to 
accept a literal translation of the Bible while independent leaners of both parties will be the 
most likely to see the Bible as the word of man. 
     For the second test of adherence to religious doctrine I use two questions.  The first is a 
“yes” or “no” question of whether the respondent attends religious services other than 
weddings and funerals.  The second question is a follow up to the “no” answer and asks 
whether the respondent considers themselves to be a part of a particular church or 
denomination.  This too is also a simple “yes” or “no” question.  Respondents will then be 
broken down into three categories: 1) those who do not attend church and do not consider 
themselves to be a part of a church or religion, 2) those who do not attend church but do 
consider themselves to be a part of a church or religion, 3) and those who do attend church.  
Null hypothesis: There will be no correlation between a respondent’s professed level of 
partisanship and their identification with a particular church or religion. 
 Research hypothesis:  Strong partisans of both parties will have higher levels of 
identification with a particular church or religion while independent leaners from both 
parties will show lower levels of identification with a particular church or religion. 
     The third measure of adherence to religious doctrine will also come from two questions.  
The first is a “yes” or “no” question asking whether religion is important in the respondent’s 
life.  The second question is a follow up if the respondent answers “yes” to the first question.  
This question asks how much does religion provide guidance in your daily life.  The possible 
responses are 1) Some, 2) quite a bit, and 3) a great deal.  This provides a four-point scale 
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with the response of “no” on the first question indicating that religion is not important to the 
respondent.   
Null hypothesis: There will be no correlation between a respondent’s professed level of 
partisanship and their reliance on religion for guidance in their daily lives. 
 Research hypothesis:  Strong partisans of both parties will have greater reliance on religion 
for guidance in their daily lives while independent leaners from both parties will show lower 
levels of reliance on religion for guidance in their daily lives. 
     These measures have both advantages and disadvantages as a measure of affect.  For 
example, how willing an individual may be to take a literal, word-for-word translation of the 
Bible could well effectively expose those with high levels of affect.  On the other hand, there 
are very few individuals (13.7% in 2000, 15.4% in 2004) who see the Bible as the word of 
man.  With a plurality of respondents seeing the Bible as the word of God that should not be 
taken literally (48.2% in 2000, 46% in 2004), we would anticipate that many of the 
independent leaners would come from this larger group.  However, we should expect that of 
those who see the Bible as the word of man a plurality will identify themselves as 
independent leaners, while those who believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible will 
provide a plurality of strong partisans.   
     There is only one question that asks if the individual identifies with a particular church or 
denomination and that question is asked only as a follow up question to those who do not 
attend church.  The church attendance question was used to get to those individuals who do 
not identify with a particular church or religion.  In this case, the act of attending church puts 
the individual at the highest level of religiosity in the measure with 70% of the sample 
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attending church in 2000 and 67% in 2004.  Ideally, there would be a question for those who 
attend church to determine whether they adhere to the doctrines of the religion of the church 
that they attend, or whether they just attend that church for a reason other than that church’s 
specific teachings.  If someone is attending a Methodist church when a Lutheran or Baptist 
church would suit them just as well, then their level of affect would be lower than someone 
who is more insistent on the specific denomination.   
     The variable for religious importance could be less an indication of affect and more an 
indication of spirituality, tolerance, or even compassion, however, it does offer a gradation 
that the other measures lack.  So even though it does not necessarily get into the question of 
whether the respondent affiliates with a group or religious institution, it does have the 
advantages of identifying those who do not see religion as important and offers a delineation 
on four dimensions rather than three.   
     The fourth measure of adherence to religious doctrine will combine the three scores  
Table 3. Coding for Variable of Overall Religious Score  




Score % ‘00 % ’04 
      
1. Bible interpretations 1. Word of Man, not God .33 x 0 0 14.4% 15.7% 
’00 – S5 2. Word of God, not literal .33 x .50 .17 50.7% 47.3% 
’04 – W4 3. Word of God, literal .33 x 1 .33 35.0% 36.9% 
      
2. Church affiliation 
‘00 – X1 & X1a 
1. Does not attend 
church/does not affiliate 
.33 x 0 0 13.8% 14.6% 
‘04 – X1 & X3 2. Does not attend 
church/affiliates 
.33 x .50 .17 16.5% 18.5% 
 3. Attends church .33 x 1 .33 69.7% 66.9% 
      
3. Religious guidance 1. Religion not important .33 x 0 0 23.5% 22.6% 
’00 – S1 & S2 2. Some guidance .33 x .33 .11 16.2% 18.0% 
’04 – W2 3. Quite a bit .33 x .66 .22 22.1% 23.5% 
 4. A great deal .33 x 1 .33 38.2% 35.8% 
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above.  In this combined score, all three questions will account for one-third of the overall 
score of affect.  While the original variables are nominal, their combination should provide a 
reliable scale.  
     A score of zero would indicate a low level of religious affect.  As scores increase, affect 
increases with a score of .99 indicating a high level of religious affect.  Scores of 0 through 
.99 are used for ease of computation.   
Null hypothesis: There will be no discernible difference between a respondent’s professed 
level of partisanship and their score of religious affect. 
 Research hypothesis:  Strong partisans will demonstrate higher scores of religious affect 
while independent leaners will demonstrate lower scores of religious affect. 
     One final question regards age.  Studies have shown younger respondents as more likely 
to identify themselves as independents, with older respondents having an increasing 
inclination to identify as partisan (Flanigan and Zingale, 1998; Keith et al, 1992).  In the 
studies by Settle et al. (2009) and Hatemi et al. (2009), they had indicated that approximately 
45% of the observed variance in partisan strength could be accounted for by genetic factors.  
This leaves about 55% of the variance unaccounted for in their studies.  It is conceivable that 
an individual who carefully and consistently considers the candidates and issues, and votes 
accordingly, may find by the time they have reached their forties or fifties that they have 
actually supported the same party’s candidates for decades, if not all of their policies.  At 
some point, the individual who had previously self-identified as independent may start to 
report themselves as either a Democrat or a Republican.  Looking at the religious scores as 
above for age groups may get us closer to understanding this relationship.  I believe the data 
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will show that the elderly are more religious than younger people, and that this could account 
for much of the correlation between age and partisanship. 
 Null hypothesis: There will be no significant difference in age groups when comparing 
professed levels of partisanship and measures of religious affect. 
 Research hypothesis:  Older age groups will demonstrate both higher professed levels of 
partisanship, as well as, higher levels of religious affect. 
 
Findings 
     It is useful to get a baseline from which to operate.  Variation in data should be looked at 
in relationship to a norm.  I have provided data for different demographic groups to establish 
what we might expect to see how commonly discussed demographic groups look when put  
Table 4. 2000 and 2004 Frequencies (in %) of Demographic Groups 
 
2000 demographic group pure lean weak strong cases 
all 11.6 28.1 27.5 32.8 1776 
education 14 + 8.4 28.5 28.5 34.6 919 
education less than 14 15.1 27.7 26.5 30.8 857 
whites 11.8 28.8 28.4 31.1 1370 
minorities 11.3 24.4 25.2 39.1 353 
Protestant attends 8.7 24 29.4 37.9 538 
Catholic attends 9.3 28.2 26.6 35.9 354 
 
2004 demographic group pure lean weak strong  
all 9.9 29.1 27.9 33.1 1195 
education 14 + 12.7 29.6 26.9 30.8 717 
education less than 14 5.6 28.5 29.3 36.6 478 
whites 8.7 29.1 27.9 34.3 865 
minorities 12.7 29.1 28.8 29.4 316 
Protestant attends 7.3 24.2 29.1 39.4 327 






in the  “folded over” partisan scale.  The demographic categories provided are: all 
respondents, 14 years education and above, less than 14 years education (14 years was 
selected as it was the median in the 2000 data), whites, minorities (this group includes blacks, 
Asians, native Americans, and Hispanics), and Protestants and Catholics who attend religious 
services.  Table 4 below shows the distribution of partisan strength in a number of 
demographic groups that are often discussed in relationship to party identification and voter 
choice.  In the data a pattern is established showing low numbers of pure independents, 
higher numbers of strong partisans, with weak partisans and independent leaners occupying 
the middle ground.  The frequency distributions of partisan intensity are fairly consistent 
between the demographic groups.  
     The question of biblical interpretation is the first to be examined.  In table 5 there is some 
consistency between 2000 and 2004 in distributions of partisan intensity among the biblical 
interpretation responses.  With the removal of nonresponsive answers, this left 1693  
Table 5. Partisan Intensity by Biblical Interpretation 
Bible interpretation pure lean weak strong % of total # of cases 
2000 - 1693 valid responses 
    
 
Literal word of God 10.6 24.2 26.4 38.9 35 592 
Not literal word of God 12.1 27.7 30.3 29.8 50.7 858 
Word of man 11.1 37 22.2 29.6 14.4 243 
 
2004 - 1162 valid responses 
    
 
Literal word of God 8.9 25.6 26.6 38.9 36.9 429 
Not literal word of God 11.6 28.7 30 29.6 47.3 550 
Word of man 5.5 38.8 25.1 30.6 15.7 183 
Pearson Chi-Square Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
2000 25.676 6 .000 
2004 21.866 6 .001 
Pearson Chi Square: 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected 
count is 27.85 in 2000 and 17.64 in 2004. 
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responses in 2000 and 1162 responses in 2004.  The distributions between the two surveys  
were quite similar.  In both years we see a plurality of those who take a literal interpretation 
of the Bible self-identifying as strong partisans, a plurality of those who take a non-literal 
interpretation of the Bible self-identifying as weak partisans, and a plurality of those who see 
the Bible as the word of man self-identifying as independent leaners. 
     Correlation is negative as partisanship moves from 1) pure independent to 4) strong 
partisan while biblical interpretation moves from 1) literal to 3) word of man, as it was in the 
original ANES data.  The results show a pattern that is statistically significant and relatively 
consistent over the time period studied.  I reject the null hypothesis.  
     For determining whether a respondent identifies with a particular church or religion, 
recoding is necessary.  Those who responded that they do attend church other than weddings  
and funerals are coded as 0 for the new variable.  For those who do not attend church, those 
who identify with a particular religion are coded as 1 and those who do not identify with a 
particular religion are coded as 5.  This coding is consistent with how the original data is 
coded by the ANES.  The results in table 6 shows the frequencies of partisan strength within 
the sample broken down by the respondent’s identification with a particular church or 
religion.  The pattern established with the Bible interpretation question is mirrored here; the 
more religious the respondent, the greater their inclination to self-identify as a partisan.   
Correlation is negative as partisanship moves from 1) pure to 4) strong while church 
affiliation moves from 0) attends church to 5) respondent has no church affiliation.  Again, 
the coding is consistent with the coding of the original ANES data.  The results demonstrate 
a pattern that is statistically significant, consistent with the pattern established by the Bible 
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Table 6. Partisan Intensity by Affiliation with a Religion 
 





2000 - 1765 valid responses  
Attends church 10.2 25.3 28.4 36.1 69.7 1231 
identifies with church 10.7 29.6 30.2 29.6 16.5 291 
Does not identify with 
a church 
18.9 40.3 20.2 20.6 13.8 243 
      
 
2004 - 1190 valid responses  
Attends church 9.5 25.6 28.4 36.4 66.9 796 
identifies with church 11.8 31.8 27.3 29.1 18.5 220 
Does not identify with 
a church 
8.6 40.8 27 23.6 14.6 174 
Pearson Chi-Square Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
2000 51.879 6 .000 
2004 21.934 6 .001 
Pearson Chi Square: 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected 
count is 27.95 in 2000 and 17.11 in 2004 
interpretation, and relatively consistent over the time period studied.  I reject the null 
hypothesis. 
     For the question of religious importance/guidance, some recoding was also necessary.  
The 2004 ANES  had already combined the two questions of religious importance and 
guidance.  Recoding was necessary for the 2000 results.  Responses that indicated that 
religion was not important were coded as 0.  Responses indicating that religion provided 
some, quite a bit, or a great deal of guidance were coded as 1, 3, and 5 accordingly.  This was 
consistent with how the data was coded for 2004.  The results are provided in table 7 on the 
next page. 
      The trends evident in the previous questions were mirrored here, with less religious 
individuals being more inclined to self-identify as partisan leaners and more religious 
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individuals being more inclined to self-identify as strong partisans.  The results show a trend 
in the correlation of partisan intensity and how much the respondent relies on religion 
Table 7. Partisan Intensity by Importance of Religion 






2000 - 1778 valid responses 
    
 
Not important 13.8 34.9 27.3 24 23.7 415 
Some guidance 11.8 28.2 31.4 28.6 16.2 287 
Quite a bit of guidance 9.7 25.6 29.4 35.3 22 391 
A great deal of guidance 11.2 25.1 25 38.6 38.1 676 
2004 - 1185 valid responses 
    
 
Not important 7.5 38.4 27.2 26.9 22.6 268 
Some guidance 14.1 28.6 30.5 26.8 18 213 
Quite a bit of guidance 8.2 26.5 29.7 35.5 23.5 279 
A great deal of guidance 9.9 25.4 26.1 38.6 35.8 425 
 
Pearson Chi-Square Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
2000 36.527 9 .000 
2004 28.311 9 .001 
Pearson Chi Square: 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected 
count is 33.10 in 2000 and 20.67 in 2004. 
for guidance in their day to day lives.  Again, there is little variation between 2000 and 2004.   
The correlation is statistically significant and stable over the time period studied.  I reject the 
null hypothesis. 
     Table 8 shows that the combined religious score demonstrates a similar trend linking 
higher religious scores to stronger partisan intensity as was seen in the Petrocik data.  The 
2004 sample would appear to be a little less religious than the 2000 sample with the 
exception of pure independents who appear to be slightly more religious in the 2004 sample. 
     The bivariate regression shows a strong correlation between the respondents’ religious 
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scores and their self-identified level of partisan strength.  Not only is the correlation 
significant, but the analysis of variance shows the variation between means is also 
significant. 
Table 8. Mean Religious Scores by Partisan Strength with Bivariate 
Regression and Analysis of Variance. 
 
partisan strength 
   2000 Mean N Std. Dev. 
pure 0.6167 194 0.28746 
lean 0.6021 470 0.30539 
weak 0.6643 470 0.2576 
strong 0.7158 557 0.26195 
total 0.6585 1691 0.28015 
2004 
   pure  0.6569 110 0.26886 
lean 0.5838 335 0.31216 
weak 0.6434 324 0.2879 
strong 0.6980 384 0.27639 
total 0.6455 1153 0.29286 
 
 
2000 B Std. error Sig. 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Constant 1.451 .062 .000 0.023 
Religious score 0.563 .087 .000 
 2004 
    Constant 1.601 .070 .000 0.012 
Religious score 0.388 .099 .000 
 Bivariate regression with 4-point scale of partisan strength as dependent variable 
 
ANOVA 
2000 Sum of 
squares df Mean Squares F Sig. 
Regression 5.399 1 5.399 5.489 .020 
Residual 258.691 263 .984   
Total 264.091 264    
      
2004      
Regression 4.041 1 4.041 4.528 .034 
Residual 210.678 226 .892   




       The final question of this study was how age influences partisan strength.  The samples 
were broken down into four different age groups.  Respondents age 17 to 29 were coded 0, 
ages 30 to 44 were coded 1, 45 to 64 were coded 2, and all others were coded 3.  The 
research hypothesis considered that older age groups would demonstrate higher levels of 
religious affect.  The means shown in table 9 bear this out.  Whether an earlier age cohort has 
been more religious through their lifetime or whether the aging process makes individuals 
more religious over their life cycle is a question for another time.  
Table 9. Mean Religious Scores by Age 
Groups 
Age groups 
  2000 Mean N Std. Dev. 
17-29 0.6068 268 0.28165 
30-44 0.6441 567 0.28965 
45-64 0.6697 572 0.28344 
65+ 0.7024 312 0.25276 
total 0.6574 1719 0.28127 
2004 
   17-29 0.6569 110 0.26886 
30-44 0.5838 335 0.31216 
45-64 0.6434 324 0.28790 
65+ 0.6980 384 0.27639 
total 0.6455 1153 0.29286 
 
     To further test the significance of the religious score, I have used a multivariate regression 
with partisan strength as the independent variable, to test the respondent’s religious scores, 
age, education, and household income.  When these other variables are added, religious 
scores and age retain significance in 2000 and 2004 while the results for education and 
income vary as shown in table 10. 
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     Based on these results, the inclination for older generations to self-identify as partisans 
may include a factor of increased religious devotion than something inherent solely within 
age itself.   
 
Table 10. Multivariate Regression with 4-Point Scale 








Constant -.579 .145 .000 0.047 
Religious 
score .514 .087 .000 
 Age .010 .001 .000 
 Education .031 .007 .000 
 Income .001 .001 .515 
 
     2004 
    Constant  .951 .133 .000 0.038 
Religious 
score .375 .100 .000 
 Age .006 .002 .000 
 Education .082 .018 .133 
 Income .000 .001 .007 
  
     The results above are sufficient to reject the null hypothesis, while supporting the research 
hypothesis.  Increased partisanship in older age groups is mirrored by higher religious scores. 
     To ensure that this significance is bidirectional and not simply a phenomenon of a single 
party attracting a large share of religious adherents, dummy variables are introduced for 
Democratic and Republican party identifiers.  Strong, weak, and leaning Democrats are 
coded as 1 with all others (including pure independents) coded as 0 for the Democratic 
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dummy variable.  Coding for the Republican dummy variable is done the same way with the 
three varieties of Republicans being coded as 1 and all others coded as 0.   
     As shown in table 11, when these dummy variables are introduced, religious scores and 
age retain their significance while education and income lose their significance.  At the same 
time, the correlations between religious scores and age with partisan strength do appear to be 
bidirectional.  
Table 11. Multivariate Regression with 4-Point Scale 
of Partisan Strength as Dependent Variable and 







Constant -.674 .118 .000 0.442 
Religious 
score .419 .067 .000 
 Age .006 .001 .000 
 Education .012 .006 .047 
 Income .001 .001 .109 
 Democrats 2.050 .061 .000 
 Republicans 1.928 .063 .000 
 2004 
    Constant -.693 .133 .000 0.396 
Religious 
score .346 .080 .000 
 Age .006 .001 .000 
 Education .011 .006 .051 
 Income .001 .001 .520 
 Democrats 1.998  .081 .000 
 Republicans 2.096 .082 .000 
 
 Discussion  
     While the validity of using religious measures as a proxy for greater affective reasoning 
can be argued, the link between religiosity and partisanship appears to be strong.  The three 
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measures; biblical interpretation, identification with a church, and religious guidance, each 
individually identify a trend of the least religious individuals identifying as independent 
leaners, the most religious identifying as strong partisans, with the weak partisans tending to 
take a middle of the road stance on religious beliefs.     
     As with any study that aggregates data through averages and frequencies of group 
responses, we are describing only an inclination and not a hard and fast rule.  There are 
individuals who score a .99 on the religious score who still identify as independent leaners 
and there are those who score a .00 on the religious score and identify themselves as strong 
partisans.  To refer to these individuals as solitary outliers would not be accurate.  To refer to 
them as minorities amongst those with similar religious scores would be accurate.  Similarly, 
it is certainly likely that those who score high on the combined religious measure and 
identify as strong partisans see little or no relationship between the two.   
     While my reasoning for seeking correlations between religiosity and partisan strength is 
based on the possibility that greater affect in the evaluative process plays into both religiosity 
and party affiliation, there is nothing in these data that proves such a link.  The argument 
could be made that those who attend church and affiliate strongly with a party just like 
belonging to groups.  While this would still indicate a difference between independent 
leaners and weak partisans it would identify the independents as being consistent with the 
first part of Dole’s textbook definition of independents as loners, but not necessarily the 
second part of the definition of being individuals who think for themselves, even though it is 
difficult to indulge in group think when you do not belong to a group.  The Bible question 
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could be seen as measuring respect for authority and the guidance question could be 
interpreted by some as being a measure of compassion.   
     Although there does appear to be a strong link between religiosity and partisan strength 
which is bidirectional, further research would be required to more clearly identify the 
theoretical connection between the two.  Perhaps a question regarding whether President 
Obama is a Christian with the possible responses of “yes”, “no”, and “the question is 
irrelevant”, might shed a little light on the subject.  One way would be providing erroneous 
information early in the interview process that appeals to an ideological worldview, testing 
for the acceptance of that erroneous information in the middle of the interview and correcting 
the information if it has been accepted, then testing at the end of the interview to see if the 
erroneous information or the corrected information was retained. 
     As with any data, it should be evaluated within the context of the times.  Independent 
Democrats of the 1960s and 1970s are likely very different from independent Democrats 
today.  Those of the 1960s and 1970s likely include more of those who are in the process of 
realignment including Southern Democrats, Catholic Pro-lifers, and blue-collar Reagan 
Democrats.  While these more recent figures may be capturing some in the process of 
realignment, there is no reason to anticipate a large wave like the realignment of the South.  I 
believe, but have yet to test, that the relationship between religiosity and partisan strength 
would hold up in the data from at least the mid-1980s to 2004.  As with other data it would 






     The debate over the nature of who are independent leaners was the impetus for this paper.  
Those who argue the point that leaners are closet partisans provide a great deal of data on 
political behavior as evidence of that fact, yet behavior is not the key to the difference 
between partisans and independents.  It is the degree to which party loyalty influences the 
evaluative process. 
     Keith et al (1992) carefully document the relationship between age and partisan strength 
but attribute this solely to lifecycle effects without recognizing the greater religiosity (not 
necessarily conservatism) of the older generations.  Whether those older generations started 
out more religious, the increased awareness of one’s own mortality, or some other reason is 
responsible for this variation is also something for further study that cannot be adequately 
covered here.  Keith et al (1992) indicated that they saw nothing in the data that warranted 
the continuation of the 7-point scale, stating, “a five-point scale combining leaners and weak 
partisans seems perfectly satisfactory” (196).  I would argue against such a solution.      
     Although the data examined by these previous scholars yielded no differences, differences 
do exist.  The specific mechanisms that link religiosity with partisanship cannot be clearly 
and empirically derived from the existing data, but a correlation does exist. 
     There is no doubt that many survey respondents mischaracterize themselves when 
responding to the questions from which the 7-point scale is derived.  Those who are 
responding to the questions are not trained in the meaning of the responses, nor do they know 
how those responses might be analyzed.  There is no reason to believe that there are any 
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more partisans mischaracterizing themselves as independents than there may be strong 
partisans who might actually be more appropriately characterized as independent leaners. 
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